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Final Version - MS L75.375
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MEMOIR 24
ON THE JUSTIFICATION OF ABDUCTION
The categories furnish the definition of abduction, from which
follows its mode of justification, and from this again its rules. The
various maxims which are found in different books are passed in review
and, for the most part, are found to sin only in vagueness. One
question not very commonly studied is what is the character of a
phenomenon which makes it call for explanation. The theory of Dr.
Carus that it is irregularity, and that of Mr. Venn that it is
isolation, though the latter is defended with some power, are
positively refuted. This refutation does not apply to the theory that
the character sought is that of being surprising. This, however, is
open to another kind of objection. The true doctrine is nearly thus,
however.
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From Draft E - MS L75.176-178
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History of the doctrine. Several rules of more or less value
which have been given examined. Comte's rule that a hypothesis must
be "verifiable" is misunderstood, or quite untenable, if it be taken
to mean that the truth of the hypothesis must be capable of being
directly observed. If it is properly understood, it only amounts to
this, that a hypothesis must be intelligible; since an unverifiable
hypothesis, such as a thing-in-itself, or such as supposing that in
complete darkness all blue things turn bright scarlet, is simply
meaningless. I consider the neglected question of what character it
is in a phenomenon which logically makes that phenomenon call for
explanation. Dr. Carus says it is irregularity. Mr. Venn says it is
isolation. Both these opinions can be decisively refuted. Another
theory, that a phenomenon demands explanation just insofar as it is
surprising, or contrary to what might have been probably predicted
from previous knowledge, escapes the objections to other solutions.
But surprise is an emotion that arises as a sort of succedaneum for an
explanation. Many other emotions have this same character, perhaps
all emotions. Shall we, then, give emotion a place in logic, and say
that every emotion ought to be replaced by a scientific hypothesis?
This is substantially what Socrates taught concerning fear; and
whoever does not approve of an emotion will naturally say something
analogous. But no such psychological doctrine can be admitted into
critical logic. The true doctrine [is] deduced mathematically from
the categories. The justification of abduction follows from it; and
from this in turn follow the rules of abduction.
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From Draft D - MS L75.270-275
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I open this intensely interesting question by showing that of
the three types of induction one alone is of any real scientific
value. I then show that all that an induction of this type really
accomplishes is to ascertain the value of a ratio. It follows that
the whole substance of science must come to us by abduction, in the
same sense in which, according to the theory of natural selection in
its extended form, the whole interval between the moner and man has
been traversed by insensible variations in reproduction. Induction,
like natural selection, merely weeds out the unfit. What, then, can
be the justification for a hypothesis? In the first place, abduction
only concludes interrogatively. But that is no sufficient answer to
the question. Idle interrogations are as noxious as can be. The only
justification is that which is often illustrated in playing the game
of whist. Three rounds remain of a hand. How the cards lie, the
leader does not know. But he does know that if they lie in certain
way, a certain lead will save the odd card, while if they do not lie
in that way, no lead will do so. This justifies his assuming, for the
purposes of the lead, that so the cards do lie. For so alone his end
may be gained. The principle is that we are always justified in
presuming, for the purposes of conduct, that our sole end may be
reached. But all belief is belief for the purposes of conduct.
Nothing has any meaning aside from practical purposes. Aside from its
practical aspects a proposition cannot be false, because a meaningless
thing is not a proposition, and as such, has no room to be false. If,
then, it comes to this, that a certain hypothesis must be true or
there is no comprehensible truth, and if, as our ethical and
esthetical discussions have shown is the case, the comprehension of
the universe is the sole aim which a man can deliberately pronounce to
be good, he is justified in unconditionally embracing the hypothesis
which is alone consonant with the attainment of a comprehension of the
truth. It need not be said that the hypotheses which perfectly
fulfill that condition are extremely few. Perhaps the hypothesis that
the universe is governed by a self-conscious mind, in the senses in
which `self-conscious' and `mind' are logically defined, is the only
one there is. Still, practically, the case often comes to that.
Possible hypotheses consist of such hypotheses as we can make. `Can'
is, no doubt, an elastic word. What "can" be done depends on the
amount of effort. Still, the effects of efforts converge toward a
limit. To fix our ideas, take a concrete example. The commander of
an army is in battle. The battle is of such importance that the total
sum of the commander's duty is to win the day. As well as he can make
out, in the limited time he has for considering the question, if a
certain position can be immediately taken, the battle may be won, but
otherwise cannot. Then logic commands him to believe with his whole
heart and soul that that position can be taken, although if he had
time to make a reconnaissance it might be foolhardy and illogical in
the extreme to come to such a conclusion merely from such data as are
actually in his possession. This illustrates how much the time that
is allowed to form an opinion has to do, logically, with that opinion.
Now a scientific investigator is in a double situation. As a unit of
the scientific world, with which he in some measure identifies
himself, he can wait five centuries, if need by, before he decides
upon the acceptability of a certain hypothesis. But as engaged in the
investigation which it is his duty diligently to pursue, he must be
ready the next morning to go on that hypothesis or to reject it. What
logic requires of him is that he should accept that hypothesis which
is the only way that he can, at that time, see in which there should
be any comprehensible truth, and think of the most surprising
observable necessary consequence of it he can, and the next morning
put that consequence to the test of experiment. Being as he is in a
double position, as an individual, and as a representative of the
science of the race, he ought to be in a double state of mind about
the hypothesis, at once ardent in his belief that so it must be, and
yet not committing himself further than to do his best to try the
experiment. If he is merely skeptical, he will not do half justice to
the experiment; if he forgets his relation to general science, he will
shrink from putting his darling theory to such a test. He must
combine the two attitudes. Mendeleef, drawing up his very rough
arrangement of the elements, and upon the basis of that risking his
detailed descriptions of Gallium, Scandium, and Germanium, is the very
exemplar of what the logic of abduction prescribes.
All this is inexact enough. I am here only endeavoring to give
a notion of the contents of this memoir. That I should lay myself
open to any just accusation of loose reasoning is not among the doubts
which trouble me most. I have for myself employed an algebraic
notation to secure the accuracy of my work; but I am not decided to
make use of it in my memoirs.
Upon this theory of the validity of abduction I base certain
rules for the practice of this kind of thought. In comparing these
with those of other logicians I remark that I find in their doctrines
far less that compels my dissent than in regard to induction,
notwithstanding their hard, inelastic conception of this kind of
reasoning. Yet it is here that they find themselves, most of them,
utterly deserted by their general conception of logic, which
it is here that I find mine most efficaciously helpful.
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Final Version - MS L75.376
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MEMOIR 25
OF MIXED ARGUMENTS
This is a highly important memoir upon a subject of singular
difficulty, although at first blush one would not anticipate any
difficulty or interest in it.
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From Draft E - MS L75.178
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Among the matters specially interesting in this memoir are the
influence upon different kinds of induction of different types of
uniformities and the argument from analogy. In both cases, views
opposed to those which I deduce by my method will be carefully
examined. This memoir is more important than might be supposed.
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From Draft B - MS L75.276
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I here consider all kinds of mixed arguments. We have, first,
arguments composed of independent arguments, either, as we may say,
competing, that is, leading to the same result, or cooperating, that
is, both required to produce the conclusion.
Next, we have arguments one of which concludes something, not
relating to the conclusion of the other, but relating to the argument
itself.
Finally, we have arguments which, from identically the same
premisses, produce the same identical conclusion in two different
ways. These are the most remarkable of the mixed arguments, and the
argument from analogy is the chief example.
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Final Version - MS L75.377
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MEMOIR 26
OF FALLACIES
There would be no advantage in devoting a special memoir to a
strictly scientific treatment of fallacies in general. It would be
like a chapter in a treatise on trigonometry which should treat of
possible errors in trigonometry. But since my purpose is that these
memoirs should not only be scientific but that they should also be
useful, I propose to devote this to fallacies because I think, though
it is not an attractive subject for a logician, that I can make the
discussion very useful. I shall not attempt a strict theoretical
development, but shall discuss fallacies under five heads, according
to their causes, showing under each head how they come about, how we
can avoid them in original reasoning and in controversy, how to detect
them and reply to others who fall into them. The five heads are: 1st,
slips; 2nd, misunderstandings; 3rd, fallacies due to bad logical
notions; 4th, fallacies due to moral causes; and 5th, sophisms
invented to test logical rules, etc. This will thus be of an entirely
exceptional character among the memoirs, more so even than the first.
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From Draft E - MS L75.178-179
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Few logicians of great theoretical force have manifested much
interest in the general doctrine of fallacies. Ought it to be treated
as a branch of pure logic? Five classes of fallacies: 1st, mere
slips, like errors in adding up a column of figures; 2nd,
misunderstandings; 3rd, fallacies having their origin in loose logica
utens or faulty logica docens; 4th, fallacies having their origins in
bad morals; 5th, sophisms which cannot deceive a sound mind but which
try the efficacy of logical rules. I consider it a duty not to
neglect this uninteresting subject; and I shall not confine myself to
a purely logical consideration of it, but say what seems likely to be
of service. 1st, certain rules may be given for checking our
reasonings so as to correct slips. 2nd, the ignoratio elenchi and
petitio principii are fallacies which presuppose that the logical
process is sound. Accordingly, no plea that an argument is one of
these fallacies should be entered in case there is any objection to
the logical process, unless that objection is to be waived. 3rd,
fallacies of the third class are extremely common, and the remarks
under this head ought to be serviceable. 4th, the fallacies of the
fourth class are common enough, too; but it is evident that no logical
medicine can reach the seat of the disease. The rules of good logic
suppose good faith. 5th, logic began with sophisms and some of them
still merit attention.
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From Draft D - MS L75.276-279
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This is a subject which has very little attracted the attention
of the stronger logicians and is consequently in the most deplorable
condition. I divide them into three classes, as follows: 1st, those
fallacies which are mere slips, such as one may fall into in adding a
column of figures, which is, indeed, a fallacy; 2nd, those which arise
from misunderstandings, such as the ignoratio elenchi and petitio
principii; 3rd, those which have their origin in loose logica utens,
or more frequently, in the inexact logic docens. To these may be
added, 4th, sophisms which really deceive nobody, but which present
problems in logic often highly instructive. I make an attempt to
enumerate all varieties. Those of the first class are hardly worth
notice; yet still not utterly useless, any more than it would be to
call attention to the ways in which there is danger of error in
performing an algebraical computation. My remarks about the petitio
principii I hope will be useful. In the third class, I call attention
to a number of fallacies that are not mentioned in any of the books.
Such, for example, is the extension of the doctrine of the burden of
proof to cases where it has no meaning, but where formalistic
reasoners appeal to it as a source of knowledge, as if it were a law
of nature. Another class of examples of fallacies, to which logicians
are especially liable (and logicians are the most fallacious reasoners
in the world), are objections to arguments as being fallacious which
are, in reality, sound, but are merely misunderstood by the objector
to be arguments of a different kind from what they profess to be. The
books are full of pretended refutations of fallacies where the
reasoning criticized is really sound. Indeed, my observation leads me
to conclude that persons of good sense whose minds are not vitiated by
logical notions rarely fall into fallacies, unless they be mere slips.
On the other hand, I know no class of books in which fallacies so
abound as works on logic and philosophy. I have carefully read a
large number of German treatises on logic of a somewhat original and
superior kind, certainly at the least estimate over fifty of them.
But I do not think I ever met with a single one--not even that of
Schroeder--which does not somewhere fall into an unquestionable and
utterly indefensible logical fallacy. This is not true of English
books, but there are few English logics of any strength. The Germans,
I think, are naturally stupid about logic, although some of the most
magnificent reasoners have been Germans. Kepler is quite incomparable
in inductive logic; Weierstrass and Georg Cantor superb in mathematical
subtlety, for all the latter's being one of the "Baconians" in
Shakespeare-ology. Among logicians, Leibniz, Lambert, Kant, Herbart
are men of distinguished power. But there is a vicious tendency to
subjectivism in Germans whenever they deal with any subject that
tempts that disposition. I do not wish to be supposed not to admire
the Germans; but when I see so many young Americans copying all their
faults and generally worshipping them, I am moved to say that they are
not gods.
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Final Version - MS L75.378-380
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MEMOIR 27
OF METHODEUTIC
The first business of this memoir is to show the precise nature
of methodeutic; how it differs from critic; how, although it
considers, not what is admissible, but what is advantageous, it is
nevertheless a purely theoretical study, and not an art; how it is,
from the most strictly theoretical point of view, an absolutely
essential and distinct department of logical inquiry; and how, upon
the other hand, it is readily made useful to a researcher into any
science, even mathematics itself. It strongly resembles the purely
mathematical part of political economy, which is also a theoretical
study of advantages. Of the different classes of arguments,
abductions are the only ones in which, after they have been admitted
to be just, it still remains to inquire whether they are advantageous.
But since the whole business of heuretic, so far as its theory goes,
falls under methodeutic, there is no kind of argumentation that
methodeutic can pass over without notice. Nor is methodeutic confined
to the consideration of arguments. On the contrary, its special
subjects have always been understood to be the definition and division
of terms. The formation of systems of propositions, although it has
been neglected, should also evidently be included in methodeutic. In
its method, methodeutic is less strict than critic.
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From Draft B - MS L75.279-280
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The first business of this memoir is to develop a precise
conception of the nature of methodeutical logic. In methodeutic, it
is assumed that the signs considered will conform to the conditions of
critic, and be true. But just as critical logic inquires whether and
how a sign corresponds to its intended ultimate object, the reality,
so methodeutic looks to the purposed ultimate interpretant and
inquires what conditions a sign must conform to in order to be
pertinent to the purpose. Methodeutic has a special interest in
abduction, or the inference which starts a scientific hypothesis. For
it is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be a justifiable one.
Any hypothesis which explains the facts is justified critically. But
among justifiable hypotheses we have to select that one which is
suitable for being tested by experiment. There is no such need of a
subsequent choice after drawing deductive and inductive conclusions.
Yet although methodeutic has not the same special concern with them,
it has to develop the principles which are to guide us in the
invention of proofs, those which are to govern the general course of
an investigation, and those which determine what problems shall engage
our energies. It is, therefore, throughout of an economic character.
Two other problems of methodeutic which the old logics usually made
almost its only business are, first, the principles of definition, and
of rendering ideas clear; and second, the principles of
classification.
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From Draft D - MS L75.329-330
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I here consider precisely what methodeutic is. I show that it
is here permissible to resort to certain methods not admissible in
stechiologic or in critic. Primarily, methodeutic is nothing but
heuretic and concerns abduction alone. Yet even as heuretic it
indirectly has to consider other matters; and it extends to subjects
that are not particularly heuretic. It is proper, therefore, in the
study of methodeutic, to begin with the study of heuretic. Now it
follows from the nature of truth, as analyzed in an earlier memoir,
that it is not merely hopeless, but utterly nonsensical, to expect to
discover anything except such things as we may hope that time will
reveal. Consequently, to discover is simply to expedite an event that
would occur sooner or later, if we had not troubled ourselves to make
the discovery. Consequently, the art of discovery is purely a
question of economics. The economics of research is, so far as logic
is concerned, the leading doctrine with reference to the art of
discovery. Consequently, the conduct of abduction, which is chiefly a
question of heuretic and is the first question of heuretic, is to be
governed by economical considerations. I show how this leads to
methodeutic inquiries of other kinds and at the same time furnishes a
key for the conduct of those inquiries.
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Final Version - MS L75.380-388
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MEMOIR 28
ON THE ECONOMICS OF RESEARCH
In all economics the laws are ideal formulae from which there
are large deviations, even statistically. In the economics of
research the "laws" are mere general tendencies to which exceptions
are frequent. The laws being so indefinite, at best, there is little
advantage in very accurate definitions of such terms as `amount of
knowledge'. It is, however, possible to attach a definite conception
to one increment of knowledge being greater than another. To work
this out will be the first business of the memoir. I also establish a
definite meaning for the amount of an increment in diffusion of
knowledge. I then consider the relation of each of these to the
expenditure of energy and value required to produce them in varying
conditions of the advancement of diffusion of knowledge already
attained. Comparing knowledge with a material commodity, we know that
in the latter case a given small increment in the supply is very
expensive, in most cases, when the supply is very small, that as the
supply increases it sinks to a minimum, from which it increases to a
very large but finite value of the supply where no further increment
would be possible at any finite cost. Putting instead of supply, the
amount of knowledge attained, we find that there is a "law," or
general tendency, subject to similar large irregularities as in the
case of the supply of a material commodity, but here even greater.
The final increase of cost of an increment with the increase of
attainment already achieved is marked, on the whole, in almost all
cases, while in many cases, at least, there is a point of attainment
where the cost of an increment is at a minimum. The same general
tendency appears in reference to the diffusion of knowledge; but there
is this striking difference, that attainments in advance of sciences
are very commonly actually on the upward slope where increments are
costing more and more, while there are few branches of knowledge whose
diffusion is already so great that a given increment of the diffusion
will cost more and more, as the diffusion is increased.
I shall next pass to a study of the variation of the utility
(meaning, generally, the scientific utility) of given small increments
of scientific knowledge and of the diffusion of knowledge in varying
states of attainment. This is to be compared with the variation of
the total amount that will be paid for a commodity for a fixed small
increment of the demand, or amount thrown upon the market to fetch
what it will, with varying amounts of that demand. Here, the
additional total amount that will be paid for the small increment of
amount sold will correspond to the utility of the small fixed increase
of scientific knowledge or of the diffusion of knowledge; while the
demand being equal to the supply, this demand, or total amount that is
sold, will correspond as before to the amount of attainment in
scientific knowledge or in the diffusion of knowledge. For a material
commodity we know that if it is given away people will only carry home
a finite amount. One would have to pay them to carry away more. On
the other hand, there is probably some maximum price for most things,
above which none at all would be sold. It necessarily follows that
beyond a certain amount thrown upon the market, a small increment in
that amount would actually diminish the total receipts from the sale
of it, while for any smaller amount the increment of receipts for a
given small increment of amount sent to market would be less and less.
With regard to the scientific utility of a small fixed advance of
knowledge, the "law" is certainly very different from that. In the
first place, there is no degree of knowledge of which a small increase
would be worse than useless, and while the general tendency is that
the utility of such fixed increase becomes less and less, yet the
curve is rather saw-shaped, since like Rayleigh's small addition to
our knowledge of the density of nitrogen, now and then a small
increment will be of great utility and will then immediately sink to
its former level. The scientific advantage of the diffusion of
knowledge is difficult to determine. It cannot be believed that any
increment of diffusion is positively unfavorable to science. It is
favorable in two ways; first, by preparing more men to be eminent
researcher; and secondly, by increasing general wealth, and therefore
the money bestowed on science. I am inclined to think that the
general tendency is that a given increment of diffusion is less and
less advantageous to science the greater the attained diffusion. But
I am not confident that this is so, at any rate without very important
deflexions. The general effect, however, is nearly the same for the
advancement as for the diffusion of knowledge. Namely, beginning with
dense ignorance, the first increments cost more than they come to.
That is, knowledge is increased but scientific energy is spent and not
at once recovered. But we very soon reach a state of knowledge which
is profitable to science, that is, not only is knowledge increased,
but the facility of increasing knowledge gives us a return of more
available means for research than we had before the necessary scientific
energy was spent. This increases to a maximum, diminishes, and
finally, there is no further gain. Yet still, in the case of energy
expended upon research, if it is persisted in, a fortunate discovery
may result in a new means of research. I shall analyze as far as I
can the relative advantages, for pure science exclusively, of
expending energy (which is of such a kind as to be equally capable of
being directed either way) to the direct advancement of knowledge and
to the diffusion of knowledge. I find the latter so overwhelmingly
more important (although all my personal sympathies are the other way)
that it appears to me that, for the present, to give to research, in
money, one or two per cent of what is spent upon education is enough.
Research must contrive to do business at a profit, by which I mean
that it must produce more effective scientific energy than it expends.
No doubt it already does so. But it would do well to become conscious
of its economical position and contrive ways of living upon it.
Many years ago I published a little paper on the economy of
research, in which I considered this problem. Somebody furnishes a
fund to be expended upon research without restrictions. What sort of
researches should it be expended upon? My answer, to which I still
adhere, was this. Researches for which men have been trained,
instruments procured, and a plant established, should be continued
while those conditions subsist. But the new money should mainly go to
opening up new fields, because new fields will probably be more
profitable, and, at any rate, will be profitable longer.
I shall remark in the course of the memoir that economical
science is particularly profitable to science; and that of all the
branches of economy, the economy of research is perhaps the most
profitable; that logical methodeutic and logic in general are
specially valuable for science, costing little beyond the energies of
the researcher, and helping the economy of every other science. It
was in the middle of the 13th century that a man distinguished enough
to become pope opened his work on logic with the words, "Dialectica
est ars artium et scientia scientiarum, ad omnium methodorum principia
viam habens." This memorable sentence, whose gothic ornamentation
proves upon scrutiny to involve no meaningless expression nor
redundant clause, began a work wherein the idea of this sentence was
executed satisfactorily enough for the dominant science of the middle
ages. Jevons adopted the sentence as the motto of his most scientific
contribution to logic; and it would express the purpose of my memoirs,
which is, upon the ground well prepared by Jevons and his teacher,
DeMorgan, and by the other great English researchers, especially
Boole, Whewell, Berkeley, Glanvill, Ockham, and Duns Scotus, to lay a
solid foundation upon which may be erected a new logic fit for the
life of twentieth century science.
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From Draft D - MS L75.281-287
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Political economy, in its general analysis by Ricardo and
others, is a fine example of logical method. Its chief fault is that
no coefficient of average stupidity is introduced and no coefficient
of average sentimentality, which could have been introduced into the
formulae. Of course, their values would have to be determined for
each class of society. Political economy now goes by the name of
economics, a change of title which obscures an important feature of
the science, that it relates to very large collections of individuals
whose average character must be much more fixed than those of the
single individuals. The chief factors to be considered are the demand
at different prices and the cost of different amounts supplied. In
the case of research we have something analogous although measures
cannot be made with any precision. The amount of the commodity is to
be represented by the amount of knowledge of a given subject. The
price is represented by the utility of an addition to knowledge,
especially the scientific utility. The cost is the amount of energy,
time, money, etc., required to produce a given increase of knowledge.
The irregularities are excessive. The peculiarities of the individual
case must always be considered. Nevertheless, there are certain
general rules, subject to frequent exceptions, the consideration of
which is far from being entirely useless. Two such rules are, that
the more we already know of a subject, the less is likely to be the
utility of a given increase of knowledge, and that the more we already
know, the greater is likely to be the cost of a given increase of
knowledge. But if for the amount of knowledge we substitute the
number of persons informed, both rules will be reversed. Hence, by
far the most valuable knowledge is that which is common experience.
This does not, in itself, decide the question between the respective
utility of diffusing and advancing knowledge; yet I think it is
evident that until people generally know enough to conduct affairs
with reasonable economy, it is bad economy to spend much on the
advancement of science. Ten millions is a small sum when we are
thinking of seventy millions of people. But if a hundred million were
expended in teaching the people of the United States some things that
are known respecting our protective tariff, it would produce a larger
amount to be applied to the advancement of science. I do not begrudge
the money spent upon churches, because what is taught in churches is,
in itself considered, the most valuable of all truth. But I wish one
tenth of that amount could be appropriated to diffusing economic
knowledge, because that knowledge would produce the wealth requisite
for the advancement and diffusion of all other knowledge. A great
capitalist who is generous is a strange and wonderful phenomenon,
while the people are naturally generous to the point of extravagance.
In the light of these considerations, it becomes a maxim of the
economy of research that great encouragement should be given to
applications of science. For although steam and electricity are
things of trifling value in themselves, since people were nearly as
good and happy before the days of steam and electricity, yet they
become of extreme utility in causing great expenditures to be made for
the advancement of pure science.
Now coming to pure science, the economy of research demands the
opening up of new branches of knowledge as soon as the study of them
can be conducted scientifically, rather than in carrying to extreme
perfection sciences from which the richest juice has already been
pressed. Carry forward the research that is promising: neglect the
one whose outlook is dismal. If for one inquiry several hypotheses
are equally attractive, and in another but one, prefer the latter. In
any given inquiry, other things being fairly equal or even
considerably against equality, prefer the hypothesis which if false
can easily be proved to be so; if it can very easily be dispatched,
adopt it at once, and have done with it. But while you hold it, hold
it in good faith, so as to do it full justice. Among hypotheses
choose one whose elements are well understood, so that unknown
complications, and consequent expense of energy cannot arise. Prefer
general hypotheses to special ones, provided the more general are so
by being simpler; if they are so by being complex, it is necessary to
consider the economics of testing them more particularly. For
instance, instead of supposing y=a+bx+cx2+dx3+etc. and determining the
coefficients, ask whether y has a constant term, next whether it tends
to infinity with x, next whether its increments are approximately
proportional to those of x, etc.
There are many economic reasons for preferring hypotheses which
seem simple. I do not here mean by simple, having only one
indeterminate element, although that is a manifest ground of
preference; but I mean simple to human apprehension. Especially, in
using abduction you already commit yourself to the hypothesis that the
truth is comprehensible to you, and therefore that what is akin to
your mind is likely to be true. Being committed to this, you scarcely
make an additional hypothesis in assuming that that which is more akin
to your natural way of thinking is more likely to be true.
Nothing unknown can ever become known except through its analogy
with other things known. Therefore, do not attempt to explain
phenomena isolated and disconnected with common experience. It is
waste of energy, besides being extremely compromising. Turn a deaf
ear to people who say, "scientific men ought to investigate this,
because it is so strange." That is the very reason why the study
should wait. It will not be ripe until it ceases to be so strange.
Do not waste your time over questions concerning which facts are
scanty and not to be gathered.
All these maxims are so many theorems of logic which I shall
endeavor in my memoir to present in systematic form.
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From Draft E - MS L75.180-181
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The chief factors are [the] relation of the amount of increments
of knowledge, first, to the scientific utility, and second, to the
necessary expenditure of energy, etc. How far there are any
regularities in these relations. There is much to be learned from the
study of the economics of research, extending even into details of
scientific procedure. I give what I have been able to deduce. I also
consider, exclusively in the interest of the advancement of science,
the economics of the diffusion of knowledge. I find that the
advantage to research from such diffusion is, in the present condition
of things, even greater than the same amount of energy expended in
research itself, supposing that energy to be equally available in
either direction. If one has a great researcher it is a terrible
waste not to use him. I give an account of certain investigations
into the mode of development of great men. I find the conditions not
dissimilar to those of the production of giant trees in a forest.
Consequently, there is an application of economics to the preparation
of men for becoming great when great men are needed. I examine the
question of the kinds of knowledge of which the diffusion is most
desirable, always in the interest of the advancement of science. I
find the normative sciences, including economics, of greatest
importance. If our people could only learn enough political economy
to see that it is a difficult science in which it is needful to trust
experts, there would be far more money to spend on science than the
genius of the country could use to the best advantage. The analytical
part of political economy is directly dependent on logical
methodeutic. It is a question whether it is not a branch of logic.
End of PART 8 of 10 of MS L75
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Dept of
Philosophy