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"Some Questions Concerning Four Incapacities Claimed For Man" is the second of a set of three papers published in the Journal of
Speculative Philosophy, appearing in Vol. 2, pp. 140-157 (1868).
The first and third papers of the set, "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" and "Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four Incapacities," appeared in the same volume, though the first and second bear the publication date of 1868 and the third the date of 1869. See the introductory remarks to the Arisbe website version of the first paper for some comments on the three papers taken as a unit, as they are clearly intended to be taken. Here I will only note that in this, the second part, Peirce provides one of his most basic and comprehensive expositions of the conception of thought considered as representational, i.e. thought as sign. This having been described, he can then proceed in the third paper in the series to explain how, in his view, that conception can provide the foundational conceptions for logic in general.
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This is a digitized version of the paper as it originally appeared, which is in the public domain. However, we insert in the text both the page numbers of the version of the paper which appears in the recent chronological edition of Peirce's work, Writings of Charles S. Peirce (Indiana University Press), and the paragraph numbers of the version of it in the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Harvard University Press). These numbers are shown within parentheses in the text and on the corresponding "buttons" in the jump-tables, e.g. "W2.49" means page 49 of Volume 2 in the Writings of Charles S. Peirce and "CP1.545" means paragraph 545 in Volume 1 of the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. The rationale is to keep referential practices in on-line publication and discussion consistent with the practices that have developed prior to this in referring to passages in Peirce's work, and the papers in this set are almost always referenced by scholars as they appear in one of those two versions. (Since the pagination of the journal in which it originally appeared is never used in scholarly reference, it is not included here.) This eliminates the need for including special pagination for the on-line digital version of this set of papers. Conventions and practices of scholarly reference in on-line publication of Peirce's work in particular will have to be developed ad hoc because of the unusually various kinds of circumstances to be accounted for and the continuing development of the new medium. There should be a continuing attempt, though, toward the development of a small number of special paradigms that will eventuate in a reasonably simple and stable universal practice as regards Peirce in particular.
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