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PEIRCE'S LOGIC OF INQUIRY OF THE 1870'S
Fragmentary Remains of a Projected Book called "Logic"
by C H A R L E S P E I R C E
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Fragment 1b
Ch. 1: The Difference between Doubt and Belief
(Entitled "Chapter 1: Enlarged Abstract" by Peirce)
MS 183 (Robin 362): Writings 3, p. 21
Winter 1871-Spring 1872
Editorial Note (Joseph Ransdell):The document as presented here has been modified by editorial paragraphing, modifications of punctuation, and use of typographical emphasis, all for the purpose of making this fragmentary material as readable as possible. Anything within square brackets is editorial in origin.
Since it is brief and largely unproblematic as regards its legibility, the need for editorial intervention was not great in the case of this particular document (as is true of several others as well); but all editorial alteration introduces interpretation, and to compensate for possible bias the almost wholly unedited version of the document that appears in Writings 3 is included below, in a text box following the edited version, for purposes of scholarly comparison.
Doubt and belief are two states of mind which feel different. We can tell by our immediate sensation almost always when we doubt and when we are convinced. This is such a difference as there is between red and blue, pleasure and pain.
Were this the whole distinction it would be almost without significance. But in point of fact the sensible distinguishability is attended with an important practical difference. When we believe, there is a proposition in our minds which determines our conduct according to rule, so that our belief being known, the way in which we shall behave may be surely deduced. In the case of doubt we have such a proposition in our minds but do not act from it, or at most it exerts only a limited force upon our action. If we do not so much as conceive the proposition to be believed, there are three cases; either our actions are entirely unconcerned with the matter, or we act as if we had some belief, or it is mere chance how we act. The last two are practically [i.e. regardable for purposes of practice as being] belief and doubt respectively.
But this is not all. Belief is satisfactory; doubt is unsatisfactory. It is the wavering of doubt which is unsatisfactory.
Doubt and belief are two states of mind which feel different. We can tell by our immediate sensation almost always when we doubt & when we are convinced. This is such a difference as there is between red & blue, pleasure & pain. Were this the whole distinction it would be almost without significance. But in point of fact the sensible distinguishability is attended with an important practical difference. When we believe there is a proposition in our minds which determines our conduct according to rule, so that our belief being known the way in which we shall behave may be surely deduced. In the case of doubt we have such a proposition in our minds but do not act from it, or at most it exerts only a limited force upon our action. If we do not so much as conceive the proposition to be believed, there are three cases; either our actions are entirely unconcerned with the matter, or we act as if we had some belief, or it is mere chance how we act. The last two are practically belief & doubt respectively.
But this is not all. Belief is satisfactory; doubt is unsatisfactory. It is the wavering of doubt which is unsatisfactory.