Howard Callaway
Hausman's Peirce and Evolutionary Realism*
Carl Hausman is a former editor of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, a revival of one of the first American philosophy journals, where Peirce published some of his early work; and Hausman has devoted a good deal of his career to Peirce scholarship. He interprets Peirce's thought "as a fallibilistic foundationalism that affirms a unique realism according to which what is real is a dynamic, evolving extramental condition."<1>
The theme is an interesting one partly in view of the many recent criticisms of foundationalism, some drawing on pragmatist sources. It promises to re-emphasize more conservative moments of the pragmatic conception of inquiry. Similarly, Hausman's approach highlights the historical continuities between pragmatism and realism in American philosophy. Still, if Peircean realism implies evolutionary pressure due to "extramental" conditions, this suggests a question. Can we also expect a corresponding realism or autonomy of human lives, thought, and cultures – themselves evolving through their interactions? A positive answer here might help avoid the decentering excesses of contemporary anti-foundationalists, implying social and institutional space for cross-fertilizations, innovations, and the rejection of social-institutional rigidities.
In his approach to Peirce, Hausman gives thorough consideration to prior work, and the brief "Interpretive Orientation" in his recent book<2> contains an annotated bibliography of selected writings, helpful to those seeking guidance with the vast and growing Peirce literature. Some works of particular interest for Hausman's interpretation include (in chronological order) Manley Thompson's The Pragmatic Philosophy of C.S. Peirce (1953); Murray Murphey's The Development of Peirce's Philosophy (1961, reissued 1993 and a useful companion volume); Christopher Hookway's Peirce (1985) and Douglas Anderson's Creativity and the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce (1987).
Another recent companion volume to Peirce studies is Kenneth Ketner's edition of Peirce's Cambridge Lectures of 1898, Reasoning and the Logic of Things. This includes a long Introduction jointly authored by Ketner and Hilary Putnam and Putnam's extensive "Comments on the Lectures." Though this is a "study edition," a "reconstruction" of the lectures, it claims to offer "the philosopher's only known, complete, and coherent account of his own work." The importance of this book for Peirce scholarship consists, in no small part, of the treatment in contains of Peirce on the mathematics of continuity, and this complements Hausman's attention to the philosophical applications.
Hausman's work contains a sympathetic and systematic introduction to Peirce, and he does not shy away from "some of the more complex issues and problematic aspects of his thought," aiming to sketch "an overarching, coherent philosophical view."<4> Treatments of problematic aspects are intended to contribute to the validation of the overall interpretation. Hausman focuses on four of Peirce's fundamental ideas: (1) pragmatism and its development into "pragmaticism," (2) his theory of signs, (3) Peirce's categories and their phenomenological basis, and (4) synechism, the theory, citing Peirce, that "continuity ..." is "an idea of prime importance in philosophy."<5> "All things that are intelligible," says Hausman in a preliminary formulation, "must be understood as unbroken relations that contain no gaps."<6> Hausman's treatment of the contrast between Peirce's work on the mathematics of continuity and its philosophic applications is instructive and can be usefully supplemented by the more extensive discussion of Peirce on the mathematics of continuity in the Ketner volume.<7> A reasonable aim here is to gain a perspective, on Peircean continuity and discontinuity, as this bears on existing discontinuities of knowledge and human understanding. Arguably, those representing distinct cultures are intelligible, though there are no doubt gaps in our understanding and appreciation of them.
Hausman's book is not without difficult passages, but it is generally well argued, attractive, and worthy of attention. Acknowledgments are generous, with thanks to correspondence with Christopher Hookway, and a list of "Peirceans," including Richard Bernstein, Vincent Colapietro, Herman Deuser, Nathan Houser, Helmut Pape, and Sandra Rosenthal, among others.
Hausman argues that the center of Peirce's philosophical project is a unique form of metaphysical realism, according to which both continuity and evolutionary change are necessary to our understanding of experience. This is an approach to Peirce on continuity and discontinuity, realism and idealism. Hausman notes that "Peirce rejected materialism," but "as close as Peirce may be to objective idealism, he is closer to...realism...," a realism according to which "there are constraining conditions on knowing and experiencing that transcend or are not reducible to mental processes... ."<8>
Elements of this interpretive thesis are developed in each of the chapters, culminating in Chapter 4, "Synechism and Peirce's Evolutionary Realism." According to Hausman, understanding Peirce as an evolutionary realist, we see the way from pragmatism to pragmaticism, understand the role of Peirce's theory of signs as a development of the pragmatic maxim, the basis and need for the categories, and we also understand the relationship of Peirce's views to traditional idealisms and realisms. The crucial interpretive thesis of the book, the centrality of evolutionary realism, is intended to deal with what Hausman sees as "the most fundamental tension in Peirce's philosophy." The problem is to understand the emphasis upon chance and spontaneity, "in the face of Peirce's consistent commitment to the necessity of continuity as an underlying condition of generality and thus of intelligibility."<9> How can spontaneity be intelligible? The short Peircean answer is that it gives rise to emergent regularities.
In the final chapter, this interpretation of Peircean realism is brought into contemporary controversies between anti-realists and anti-idealists. Hausman's Peirce is brought into the discussion of related views of Rorty, Davidson, Putnam, and Quine. This is a particularly interesting aspect of the book. It brings perspectives developed in the on-going Peirce revival into contact with recent debates of American analytic philosophy. The book is thus useful in introducing Peirce to those of an analytic outlook. Because analytic philosophy, and specially American analytic philosophy, has been intermittently influenced by Peirce, and by his Wirkungsgeschichte in the pragmatist tradition, we should expect a further deepening of cross-currents to be fruitful for both sides of the divide.
1. From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism
Following the Introduction, a concise overview of chief themes, the first chapter is devoted to "The Origins of Pragmaticism," and concerns Peirce on belief and doubt, the pragmatic maxim, and the later development of pragmatism as Peirce sought to distinguish his philosophy from that of William James and to give both realism and idealism their due. The chapter begins the exposition by focus on "The Fixation of Belief" (1877) and "How to make Our Ideas Clear" (1878). "Most of the issues so important to Peirce throughout his career," Hausman holds, "will be seen to emerge within the context of his concerns in the 1877 and 1878 articles."<10>
For Peirce, the articles represent "a theory of inquiry based on his conception of experimental science." His ultimate aim is to "incorporate the logic of scientific method into philosophy."<11> Hausman remarks that Peirce's theory of inquiry is influenced by Darwin on biological evolution. The description of inquiry in "The Fixation of Belief" is a matter of a "struggle to pass from a state of doubt to a state of belief," and a struggle for the survival of "successful beliefs." But the reader is warned that Peirce was to transform the conception of evolution, ending up with a "general hypothesis concerning cosmic evolution." Least of all should we think of Peirce's theory of inquiry in the categories of 19th century social Darwinism, though Darwin's influence "is made explicit by a reference near the beginning of the articles to Darwin's application of statistical method to biology."<12>
For Peirce, "inquiry has only one aim: the settlement of opinion, which is to say, the formulation of a belief that takes the place of doubt."<13> Though he insists that a leading principle of inquiry or habit of mind "is good if it generally leads from true premises to true conclusions,"<14> he notes that "we are entirely satisfied 'as soon as a firm belief is reached' a belief that 'we think to be true'."<15> These points initiate a tension in Peirce's thought and pragmatism generally. One pole is represented by William James and "The Will to Believe," while readings of Peirce's "infinite community of inquiry" stands at the opposite pole. The Deweyan theme of contextualism represents the golden mean here, but this is not a kind of point which Hausman considers. Neglect of Dewey in this volume is unfortunate, since Dewey's treatments of Peircean themes, from the 1930's to the end of his career, are a major source of the contemporary Peirce revival.
Hausman remarks that "Peirce does, in his early career, sometimes seem to align himself with what James later identified ...as pragmatism," but "the context of these remarks and the way Peirce leads the discussion that follows indicates that he does not intend to make truth subjective."<16> Citing a later footnote to the passage in which Peirce equates "a firm belief" with a belief "we think to be true," Hausman urges that "the satisfaction that concludes inquiry is not in the form of an immediate gratification but rather is the result of a critical assessment"<17> Truth, Peirce says in a footnote added in 1903, is "that character of a proposition which consists in this, that belief in the proposition would, with sufficient experience and reflection, lead us to such conduct as would tend to satisfy the desires we should then have."<18> How are we to understand "sufficient experience and reflection?"
A role for critical assessment is evident, since Peirce insists on the need of the scientific method to settle belief. Knowing what counts as "sufficient experience and reflection" thus comes to depend on our understanding of scientific methods, though it is not exhausted in considering scientific methods. "The alleviation of doubt that is fully satisfactory," Hausman urges, "comes from firm beliefs that function in the long run and in a community that has a status independent of any particular group at any fixed time."<19> In the end this requires some treatment of problems concerning the structures and interrelations of communities as needed to facilitate the growth of knowledge, a problem not unrelated to the function of "leading principles" in inquiry.
Peirce, in considering the fixation of belief, opposes the methods of science to the methods of tenacity, of authority, and the a priori method. Regarding mere individual tenacity in belief, Peirce notes that it "will be unable to hold its ground in practice," since "the social impulse is against it."<20> Much the same may be said concerning the method of authority, if we consider intervals of time in which different communities, relying on different authorities, ultimately come into extensive contact. The method of authority is the tenacity of communities.
The a priori method, as Peirce describes it, has similar weaknesses. "This method,... does not differ in a very essential way from that of authority."<21> It is "...far more intellectual and respectable from the point of view of reason than either of the others...," and "as long as no better method can be applied, it ought to be followed." Still, "its failure has been the most manifest. It makes of inquiry something similar to the development of taste;...," and "accordingly metaphysicians have never come to any fixed agreement,... ."<22> Peirce does not oppose metaphysical speculation, instead he insists that speculative thought must finally be brought to the test of experience. What is particularly relevant to the evaluation of Peirce's own metaphysics of continuity, spontaneity, and evolution are the ways in which these principles might guide successful inquiry: they must both fit accepted methodologies and suggest how they might be usefully developed.
"Sufficient experience and reflection," as required for a critical assessment, the resolution of doubt and the fixation of belief is, then, a long-run affair for Peirce, linked to communities of inquiry. Moreover, the social impulse which leads us to resist short-term resolutions, according to Hausman preshadowing his realist interpretation, gives expression to "contingencies or resistances to our thinking that are not limited to our impulses." For, "the hypothesis of realism justifies the pursuit of inquiry, which is an expression of the social impulse."<23> "Peirce's commitment to a form of scientific realism," on Hausman's account, "is clearly established,"<24> and there is clearly a metaphysical realism connected to it. The question of how this realism is to be understood and justified is one pursued throughout the present book. I return to it chiefly in discussions of the later chapters.
Another important puzzle in the first chapter concerns the "pragmatic maxim" and its relationship to positivistic conceptions of meaning. Hausman notes that there are passages in Peirce's early work suggesting a positivistic conception of linguistic meaning, "which rejects all questions and their answers as meaningless, if they do not refer to actual, definite sense-experiences or to linguistic conventions alone."<25> But where others have seen instrumentalism or operationalism, Hausman, while allowing for Peirce's development, finds elements of a meaning holism, including the meaningfulness of metaphysical speculation, a persistent anti-nominalism, and an insistence on the relationship of any given linguistic element to systems. Given the influence of nineteenth century idealism on Peirce's thought, we have every reason to expect that his treatment of language and meaning show the same holistic influence.
2. Pragmatism and Semeiotic
The second chapter, "Pragmaticism and Semeiotic" focuses on the Peircean theory of signs. It concerns the origin of semeiotic (Hausman follows Peirce's dominant spelling) starting from the early criterion of meaning offered in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." According to Hausman, "pragmaticism implies semeiotic," and "Peirce's development of his anti-Cartesianism and his departures from Kant served as a basis for his semeiotic."<26> In the context of a discussion of "sign action," or "semeiosis," Hausman emphasizes a Peircean distinction between "two kinds of object, the immediate and the dynamical," a distinction important to his overall interpretation. The distinction functions, in many ways, like the act-object distinction of traditional Aristotelian realisms.
"Pragmaticism," we must presume this includes aspects of Peirce's semeiotic, or theory of signs, "is a theory of meaning," according to Hausman. "The meanings of general concepts or terms,..., are dispositions, habits, or laws that can be formulated in linguistic expressions."<27> Meanings allow for indeterminacy or vagueness, and thus "they remain to be interpreted with respect to the particular consequences that follow from acting in accord with them."<28> They cannot be completely detached from (possibly hypothetical) plans of actions. Moreover, since "meaning consists of ever widening connected consequences," it follows that the pragmaticist's maxim concerns "a growing web of consequences and their interpretations," thus implying "a system of signs" and further interpretations.<29>
Hausman amplifies the point concerning system by reference to epistemological themes in the following section. "Whatever is asserted as knowledge must be part of a system," he argues, "cognitions cannot be isolated."<30> The point is connected with Peirce's rejection of "the crucial Cartesian notion of cognitive intuition"<31> and with the rejection of claims to self-evidence in the pragmatist tradition.
In the end, it seems clear that we must see Peirce's theory of signs as a philosophy of language and thought, whatever else it involves, an important precursor of contemporary views, in which "every thought is a sign."<32> The connected literature is very large.
3. Categories and Phenomenology
Peirce's theory of categories is doubtlessly important for any account of his overall views, but it constitutes a stumbling block for many. What are we to make of Peirce on "Firstness," "Secondness," and "Thirdness?" Peirce puts these forward as universal categories, applicable to everything. He developed his theory of categories Originally from Kant (see Peirce's "New List of Categories,"1867, where the categories are "based upon the theory already established, that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity and that the validity of a conception consists in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it" CP 5.223 ff.), and later reformulated it in light of his development of the logic of relations and quantification.<33>
As Hausman emphasizes, the later exposition of the theory of categories is developed within a kind of phenomenology, which Peirce called "phaneroscopy." This is akin to traditional roles of "experience" in philosophy, from Locke through Dewey. It is "foundationalist" in that it introduces a conservative constraint of "universal experience" on the interpretation of any special experience. While the "main body of philosophy" rests "exclusively upon universal experience," which imparts "a tinge of necessity," still, for "certain special yet obtrusive points," philosophy "is obliged to appeal to the most specialized observations, in order to ascertain what minute modifications of everyday experience they may introduce."<34> This is the continuity of philosophy, common sense, and the special sciences in Peirce and one reason for Hausman's talk of a "fallibilistic foundationalism."
The rejection of the subject-predicate logic of the "New List" is important in understanding the relationship of the Peircean categories to the logic of relations, as is Peirce's thesis that we cannot replace all triadic predicates with any combination of monadic or dyadic predicates. The point is supported by use of examples. According to Peirce, "every genuine triadic relation involves thought or meaning. Take for example the relation of giving. A gives B to C. This does not consist of A's throwing B away and its accidentally hitting C. ...If that were all, it would not be a genuine triadic relation, but merely one dyadic relation followed by another."<35> The talk of "genuine triadic relations" allows that some apparently triadic relations should be analyzable or reducible but insists that some are not. Beyond this, Peirce also held that all higher-order relations can be reduced to his three categories. Hausman comments, though, that Peirce sustained "a kind of fallibilism with respect to the issue,"<36> and this allows that the categories, or their position in Peirce's thought, is also subject to fallibilistic considerations. Still Peirce insists that crucial elements are lost if we try to get by without irreducible triads.
4. Spontaneity, Evolution, and Continuity
Though Hausman takes a clear stand for a Peircean realism, he allows that the very sense of the term "realism" undergoes some change in the application. There are apparently conflicting texts. Peirce can be found to say that "The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws."<37> In an 1886 letter to Francis E. Abbot, "Peirce claims himself 'not only phenomenalist, but also idealist'."<38> In 1903 he indicates that his doctrine "might very well be taken for a variety of Hegelianism (because Hegel is so nearly right)."<39> Putnam, in the Ketner volume, points out an additional passage: "...If you were to call my philosophy Schellingism transformed in the light of modern physics, I should not take it hard."<40> One important complication attaching to this issue is that Peirce's conception of physics is Newtonian. He was convinced that it was impossible to explain mind or intelligence on the basis of Newtonian mechanics. The point underlies his commitment to other forms of explanation, though a forced option of idealism or quasi-Newtonian materialism has considerably less appeal now than it did in Peirce's day, especially for those convinced of the autonomy of the special sciences.
How are these "idealist" passages to be reconciled with the many passages where Peirce affirms his realism? "I should call myself an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing approaching Scotism," says Peirce, "but going much further in the direction of scholastic realism."<41> Consulting the passage at CP 5.489, fn. 1, we see that Peirce explicitly contrasts his Aristotelianism with Hegelian views: "A great variety of thinkers call themselves Aristotelians, even the Hegelians, on the strength of special agreements. No modern philosophy, or very little, has any real right to the title." At least we see here that Peirce does not consider himself a Hegelian idealist. No Hegelian is an Aristotelian, according to Peirce, but Peirce is an Aristotelian, so Peirce is not a Hegelian. But what meaning can we find for the phrase, "objective idealist" as applied to the author of the critique of idealist philosophy in Peirce's review of Frazer's Edition of The Works of Geogre Berkeley,<42> or as applied to the scientific realist of "The Fixation of Belief," and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," or to Peirce as scholastic realist? Though Hausman does not discuss the idea, the best account may be that Peirce changed his mind about idealism and realism in his late work.
Other than suggesting that Peirce put considerable emphasis upon the idea of constituting experience, as found among idealist authors, I leave this question of reconciliation chiefly to the reader. However, it is worth noting that Peirce does present his synechism, the doctrine of continuity, as something involving both a realism and objective idealism. The following passage comes from the paragraph marked "Conclusion" in "The Law of the Mind," as edited for the Collected Papers:
- I have thus developed as well as I could in a little space the synechistic philosophy, as applied to mind. I think that I have succeeded in making it clear that this doctrine gives room for explanations of many facts which without it are absolutely and hopelessly inexplicable; and further that it carries along with it the following doctrines: first, a logical realism of the most pronounced type; second, objective idealism; third, tychism, with its consequent thoroughgoing evolutionism.<43>
As Hausman puts the point, "Peirce's idealistic tendencies constitute only a component of his architectonic rather than its final commitment."<44> What is mean by "logical realism of the most pronounced type" in this passage is certainly of interest for a realist interpretation of Peirce's work, and given Peirce's professed Aristotelianism, we are brought to think of this as a realist theory of universals and a holistic anti-nominalism. More generally, though, if we see the pragmatist tradition as departing from and overcoming the dichotomy of empiricism and rationalism in epistemology, then this invites the idea that Peirce sought to go beyond the classical dichotomy of realism and idealism in metaphysics. What lies in this direction, I suggest, is an interactionist or transactionalist realism.
The Peircean concept of continuity is intimately related to his development and application of the logic of relations. If we view meanings of expressions as dependent upon larger contexts of discourse, then there are grounds for Peircean fallibilism in this. For we cannot evaluate claims making use of such vocabulary independent of changing contexts and the growth of knowledge. This suggests immediately, that there can be no absolutely a priori truths, since such a status would imply context-free validity and context-free meaning. But likewise, reports of observation are subject to reinterpretation and revision in the light of expanding contexts of knowledge, since their meaning is also dependent upon contexts of discourse.
Now Peirce can be found to say that "The principle of continuity is the idea of fallibilism objectified."<45> "The doctrine of continuity rests upon observed fact," Peirce claims, "But what opens our eyes to the significance of that fact is fallibilism."<46> Once we become "fully impressed with the fact that absolute exactitude never can be known," we "naturally ask whether there are any facts to show that hard discrete exactitude really exists. That suggestion lifts the edge of that curtain," and we "begin to see the clear daylight shining in from behind it."<47> Fallibilism is a chief clue to Peirce's metaphysics.
"But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true significance," Peirce proceeds, "until evolution has been considered."<48> Neither can "fallibilism objectified," i.e., Peircean continuity, be understood except in connection with Peirce on evolution. Though spontaneity presents no instance of presently know uniformities or regularities, the unexpected is something to be expected in the world which Peirce envisages, and in view of the fact of evolutionary change, it is something which may lead on to new regularities. The emergence of new biological species, reproducing after their kind, is the most obvious case in point. But beyond this Peirce is convinced that the universe has itself evolved, from pure chance toward total regularity. In this he is a precursor of important strands of contemporary quantum theory and cosmology.
Moreover, the facts of biological diversity argue against a merely mechanistic or determinist conception of evolution. Consider, for instance the diversity of the marsupials in Australia and the way that they seem to occupy nearly every available environmental niche, the separateness and uniqueness of their development in contrast with the similarity of their environment to that of neighboring lands. These facts argue for an "open universe" to use Popper phrase, where results of development are not pre-determined by existing conditions, though they are sometimes facilitated, and they may be undermined. Popper provides methodological, physical, and cosmological arguments of his Peircean "indeterminism," and evaluation of his position cannot be separated from the historical background in Peirce.
The idea is that existing conditions always contain potentialities for further development, some of which turn out productive, and others of which remain unproductive. Drawing on Peirce's discussion of "evolutionary love," Hausman seems to capture crucial elements of Peirce's conception of evolution. "If evolution is open to creative change," says Hausman, "change not flowing from some form of necessity, external or internal, then it must be conditioned by something which is open to what it does not determine and which may turn in a direction not already determinative of the condition itself."<49> Hausman has a fine ear for Peircean rhetoric, and is able to see Peirce's doctrines, or important elements of them, through all the variety of Peirce's changing contexts of discussion and audience. Though Peirce is sometimes outrageously speculative to the scientific audiences he sought to address, there is surely no reason to think that he sought to insulate his speculative thought from contact with experimental evidence, broadly construed.
5. Peirce and Contemporary Realism
Hausman's final chapter projects Peirce's views into contemporary debates. He is particularly concerned to apply the Peircean themes of semeiotic and evolutionary realism to debates concerning metaphysical realism and anti-realism on the one hand and relativism and anti-relativism in interpretation theory. A chief interest is to show that Peirce's views "avoid some of the consequences of recent attacks on the possibility of affirming realism,"<50> and Hausman is concerned to beat back the pan-textualism arising from recent literary theory. In criticism of Rorty, Hausman questions the presuppositions of Rorty's rejection of realism. The realism or objectivism Rorty criticizes is needlessly strong. In particular, the realist need not assume that there is "a neutral comprehensive vision of reality that can be supported by criteria of truth or adequacy."<51> Again, the realist need not assume a "God's eye view."
"From the standpoint of semeiotic," Hausman points out, contemporary "anti-foundationalism appears as anti-representationalism." "Signs do represent, but what they represent is more signs and only signs."<52> Rorty is the chief target here, while Davidson is found to be "closer to Peirce's realism than may be immediately apparent," Putnam's internal realism is put forward as an alternative which helps to show the uniqueness of Peirce's view, while Quine is considered in connection with an objection to Peirce.<53> Hausman sees the mistakes of contemporary anti-foundationalism as connected with the refusal to adopt a Peircean, and fallibilistic, foundationalism. In giving reasons for ontic and methodological commitments, we are to steer between absolutism and relativism. This kind of position is deserving of further explorations.
* Slightly expanded from Dialectica, Vol. 50, Fasc. 2, 1996, pp. 153-161
<1> Carl Hausman, Charles S. Peirce's Evolutionary Philosophy, Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 1993, p. xvii.
<2> Hausman, pp. xiii-xvii.
<3> Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992
<4> Hausman, p. vii.
<5> Ibid., p. 178.
<6> Ibid., p. 2.
<7> Cf. e.g., Ketner, pp. 37-54; see also Murray Murphey, The Development of Peirce's Philosophy, reissued, Hackett, 1993, p. 336.
<8> Hausman, p. 4.
<9> Ibid., p. 142.
<10> Ibid., p. 20.
<11> Ibid., p. 20.
<12> Ibid., p. 20-21; Peirce, Collected Papers, 5.364.
<13> Quoted, Ibid., p. 23.
<14> Ibid., p. 22.
<15> Ibid., p. 23; cf. Peirce, CP 5.375.
<16> Ibid., pp. 23-24.
<17> Ibid., p. 23.
<18> Peirce, CP 5.375, fn. 2.
<19> Hausman, p. 25.
<20> Peirce, CP 5.378.
<21> Peirce, CP 5.383.
<22> Peirce, CP 5.383.
<23> Hausman, p. 32.
<24> Ibid., p. 34.
<25> Ibid., p. 42.
<26> Ibid., p. 57.
<27> Ibid., p. 57.
<28> Ibid., p. 57.
<29> Ibid., pp. 57-58.
<30> Ibid., p. 61.
<31> Ibid., p. 60.
<32> Peirce, CP 5.470.
<33> Cf. Murphy 1993, pp. 298ff; see also Ulrich Baltzer, Erkenntnis als Relationengeflecht: Katagorien bei Charles Sanders Peirce, Munich, Schöningh, 1994.)
<34> Quoted in Hausman, p. 117; cf. Peirce, CP 1.273.
<35> Hausman, p. 131; Peirce, CP 1.345.
<36> Ibid., p. 132.
<37> Peirce, CP 6.24, 1891.
<38> Quoted in Hausman, p. 148.
<39> Peirce, CP 5.38; Hausman, p. 148.
<40>. Cf. Ketner, p. 97.
<41> Quoted in Hausman, p. 154.
<42> Peirce, CP 8.7-8.38, 1871.
<43> Cf. Hausman, p. 154; Peirce, CP 6.163.
<44> Hausman, p. 154.
<45> Peirce, CP 1.171.
<46> Peirce, CP 1.172.
<47> Peirce, CP 1.173.
<48> Peirce, CP 1.174.
<49> Hausman, p. 176.
<50> Ibid., p. 194.
<51> Ibid., p. 195.
<52> Ibid., p. 196.
<53> Ibid., p. 197.
END OF: Callaway, "Hausman's Peirce and Evolutionary Realism"
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