H.G. Callaway
Values and Conflicts of Values in the
Pragmatist Tradition
This paper proceeds from an analysis (Callaway 1992, pp. 239-240) of a role of conflict in the origin of value commitments, a pervasive sociological pattern in the development of unifying group values which transforms personal conflicts, or differences, into large-scale collective conflicts. I have urged that these forces are capable of distorting even the cognitive processes of science and that they are a chief reason why value claims are regarded as incapable of objective evaluation.
The thesis of the present paper is that romantic collectivism (uncritical attachment to an identification group) renders members passive with respect to the ideals or content embodied in collective identity and that this is often exploited to convert groups into instruments of personal power. The issue is examined by reference to Reinhold Niebuhr's 1932 thesis of the inevitability of group egoism and inter-group conflicts and an opposing pragmatist conception of moral development, self-identity, and the individual's relationship to reference communities.
1. The essence of pragmatism?
In a recent book, Jürgen Habermas makes use of a quotation from William James, inscribed on the wall of William James Hall at Harvard, which he claims to express "the essential intuition of pragmatism" (Habermas 1993, p. 114).The community stagnates without the impulse of the individual, the impulse dies away without the sympathy of the community.I found myself fascinated with this quotation and circulated it to colleagues asking their opinions. One senior Professor in a somewhat embattled department wrote back almost immediately that the second part is clearly false. This is to say that the impulse of the individual does not always die away where it lacks the sympathy of the community, and this is a point that James might have appreciated deeply, since he was himself a life-long friend of the embattled figure of Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce, in turn, was not the sort of man to enjoy broad sympathy in the academic community. Yet his work and efforts long persisted.
There can be no doubt that James expresses, with this maxim, deep intuitions concerning the relationship of the individual and community. Habermas puts it this way:The maxim asserts the reciprocal dependence of socialization and individualization, the interrelation between personal autonomy and social solidarity, that is part of the implicit knowledge of all communicatively acting subjects; it does not merely express a more or less subjective opinion concerning what some person believes is the good life (Habermas 1993, p. 114).While I do not dispute the points made here in explication of James's maxim, there is certainly room to question the idea that James put his finger on the essential intuition of the pragmatic tradition. No doubt there are communities of sympathy, and we have all required the support and nurturing supplied by such communities, the family, a neighborhood, a school, or a religious group. What I dispute is the seemingly exclusive focus on communities of sympathy suggested by claiming that James's maxim expresses the essential intuition of pragmatism. Habermas does not emphasize sufficiently how sympathies may grow and develop.
A contrasting theme arises from John Dewey's emphasis upon cooperativeness. Cooperativeness is in some ways less than sympathy, but it is also much more. Sympathy is a relatively strong sentiment which leads us to extend ourselves to particular persons, often based on their need and proximity, or the similarity of their goals and feelings to our own. Cooperativeness is cooler than sympathy, but it is also capable of wider extension and explorations.
Cooperativeness is an orientation to action. Specifically, it is an orientation to joint projects, arguably more characteristic of the integrative emphasis of Dewey's mature naturalism and the fundamental needs of American society. Mutual respect and sympathy may arise from the interaction it occasions. But cooperation is capable of expanding beyond the bounds of sympathy.
Dewey speaks of cooperativeness in connection with his paraphrase of the slogan of the French revolution. (Cf. Dewey, 1939, pp. 78-79.) Where the revolution had called for "Liberté, égalité, fraternité," Dewey transformed this into a call for freedom, equality, and cooperativeness. The contrast is instructive. Universal fraternity is arguably an illusory goal. Taking the word literally, we suspect that people will always feel greater fraternity (and sympathy) with those to whom they are more directly related. Still, exclusive emphasis upon communities of sympathy may lead to undesirable social rigidities or conflicts, and Dewey's concept of cooperativeness is an approach to the problem of facilitating the reconstruction and interrelations of our communities of sympathy as the need may arise. Cooperation can operate a various levels, even where serious differences and disagreements persist. It helps us build mutual trust and respect of the sort required for deeper discussions of outstanding difficulties and differences. The viability of cooperativeness is the touchstone of our defense of the ideals of freedom and equality, and the touchstone of our openness to needed social reconstruction. Freedom and equality formalistically defined may fade into empty slogans where the opportunity for joint projects is proscribed in practice.
Thus, in this paper, I make a plea for Dewey's conception of cooperativeness. Given that there are various "communities of sympathy," it is clear that we do not treat each other as complete equals in every respect. Instead we tend to give some considerable preference to those who share our values and projects. This is obvious with respect to communicative access in particular. The point boarders on questions regarding "democratic elites" and "participatory democracy." Communication between groups and broader participation are crucial to the solution of outstanding social-intellectual problems. But this is far from saying that every social boundary is an impediment to the solution of social-intellectual problems. Clearly, we must allow for people going their own separate ways when this presents no great problem, though a particular group or person may not always be the best judge of existing patterns of communication or relevant problems. Thus one expects that concern for equality and protests against discriminatory exclusion will persist as a vehicle of social-intellectual reconstruction. It would be a serious mistake to emphasize group solidarity to the exclusion of equality and cooperativeness.
2. Is collective egoism inevitable?
Criticizing the social-political stance of moralists, including John Dewey, Reinhold Niebuhr urged, in his classic Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932), a "failure to recognize the stubborn resistance of group egoism to all moral and inclusive social objectives" (p. xx).What is lacking in all these moralists, whether religious or rational, is an understanding of the brutal character of all human collectives, and the power of self-interest and collective egoism in all inter-group relations (p. xx).An overly-optimistic view of human nature, a "romantic over-estimate of human virtue and moral capacity," in Niebuhr's phrase, blinds us to "the limitations of the human imagination, the easy subservience of reason to prejudice and passion, and the consequent persistence of irrational egoism, particularly in group behavior" (p. xx). For Niebuhr, these factors "make social conflict an inevitability in human history, probably to its very end." Niebuhr sees collective egoism "in all inter-group relations," and group conflicts as inevitable. But note the "probably."
Believing conflict and collective egoism inevitable leads us to join up with one side or another, making the best of a bad situation. Certainly this is best in some existing situations. But believing conflict inevitable may amount to self-fulfilling prophecy. Beyond that prospect is the strategy of fomenting and exaggerating conflicts in order to organize or victimize others and profit from them. I am reminded that the citizens of major European capitals came out on the streets to celebrate as the First World War broke out in 1914, and it is difficult to believe that they did not expect to profit from their neighbors. Niebuhr might well have relied on the point in his arguments.
These facts, however pervasive, do not demonstrate inevitability. The talk of inevitability, as this is extended to the exaggeration of conflicts, enters the domain of Popper's well-known critique of historicism (Popper 1957; 1982). Popper's argument turns on the premises that the course of history is strongly influenced by the growth of knowledge, and that "we cannot predict, by rational or scientific methods, the future growth of our scientific knowledge." Hence, "there can be no scientific theory of historical development serving as a basis for historical prediction" (Popper 1957, p. vi). If we cannot have a scientific theory of historical development, then neither should we expect a scientific theory of historical stasis. Arguments for the inevitable exaggeration of conflict are doubtful. (Cf. Callaway 1993, pp.145-64.) This point suggests a search for social conditions underlying the intractability of collective conflict and the possibility of ameliorative steps.
What element or degree of social conflict is inevitable? The point is not easy to pin down. Niebuhr allows, that it "may be possible, though... never easy, to establish just relations between individuals within a group purely by moral and rational suasion and accommodation," but still he insists that "in inter-group relations this is practically an impossibility." In consequence, he holds that "relations between groups must...always be predominantly political rather than ethical, that is, they will be determined by the proportion of power that each group possesses at least as much as by any rational or moral appraisal of the comparative needs and claims of each group" (Niebuhr, p. xxii-xxiii). But, since he allows that political and ethical considerations do interact, it is difficult to see why we should expect that power politics will always fail to accommodate ethical considerations. Again, he does not rule out that "increase in social intelligence and moral goodwill" may "mitigate the brutalities of social conflict," yet "they cannot abolish the conflict itself"(xxiii). But if "conflict" here means something like "differences," the point is too weak to support the thrust of Niebuhr's arguments. If it is meant to include the exaggeration of differences and the effects of collective egoism, then we are yet to see why Niebuhr thinks the effects of increased social intelligence and good will must always fail to control collective egoism.
The reasoning offered is that groups cannot understand "the interests of others as vividly as they understand their own," and they are incapable of a moral goodwill "that would prompt them to affirm the rights of others as vigorously as they affirm their own" (p. xxiv). Exaggeration of differences is supposed inevitable, because of our lack of understanding and good will, and these factors are produced by narrow self-interest. Still, it is unclear whether this must include racial, ethnic, or class hatreds, vicious nationalism, and war. Beyond that it is unclear that lack of understanding and narrow self-interest are themselves inevitable. The horrible growth of the technology of violence may yet focus the human mind.
Though Niebuhr professes a political realism, the contrast with the political and moral meliorism (cf. Campbell 1992, Chp 7; Callaway 1994a) of the pragmatist and naturalist tradition is imperfect. We cannot clearly agree, for instance, that Dewey lacked understanding of the "brutal character" of human collectives, and the "power of self-interest and collective egoism" in inter-group relations. I see Dewey as aware of these difficulties and attending to the means to alleviate them.
Given that social differences and conflicts exist, we attempt to analyze the interests involved and bring affected individuals to understand how interests might be satisfied without exaggerating conflict. This need not ignore persistent refusals to consider wider interests. On the other hand, we might begin straight off building convenient coalitions with sufficient social and political power to force resolutions. The first strategy analyzes smaller problems out of larger ones, breaks them down to digestible pieces, while the second seeks to resolve differences by first erecting large-scale political divisions and emphasizing the need to take sides. While the first approach links conflict resolution to detailed factual evidence and broader participation of all affected by decisions, the second acquiesces in overt or covert coercion involved in exaggerated conflicts.
Niebuhr over-states his case. Rice, in his recent study, characterizes this as a matter of Niebuhr's "most polemical moments" (1993, p. 24), and "his most radical phase" where he judged liberalism in philosophy a "spent force" and sounded the death knell of capitalism (cf. p. 29). I do not doubt the need to keep our powder dry or the practical difficulties involved. But not all human collectives are brutal or equally brutal, and inter-group relations are not totally ruled by self-interest and collective egoism. We need to emphasize how rational mediation can be independent of power relationships and should aim at a reconstruction of power relationships in support of moral aims. Though allowing for ameliorative factors, Niebuhr seems at times perilously close to a doctrine of original sin for collectives.
He tends to dichotomize "reason" or "intelligence" vs. impulse in ways which falsify the stress on continuity in Dewey's treatments. Thus Rice cites Niebuhr as arguing, early on that "social intelligence can have a part in guiding social impulses only if it does not commit the error of assuming that intelligence has destroyed and sublimated impulse to such a degree that impulse is no longer potent" (1993, p. 33). But Dewey's view was that we must use "released impulse as an agent of steady reorganization of custom and institutions" (Dewey 1922, p. 72), and that "Interests are specific and dynamic; they are the natural terms of any concrete social thinking" (Dewey 1920, p. 195). Surely, the dangers of collective egoism are more imposing for larger groups and groups lacking opportunities for democratic participation. But groups with significant democratic institutions are less likely to engage in vicious forms of collective conflict (cf. Russett 1993). These democratic forms require our active support.
If interests can be satisfied, or satisfactorily developed, by participatory processes within our communities, we look for solutions to inter-group problems which rely more on mediation than on preponderance of power. Human groups differ, and those exclusively built on power politics tend toward more vicious forms of inter-group conflicts. So, there is a danger that a political realism focused on inevitable collective egoism may itself function to aggravate social and collective conflicts. The effect is produced precisely by the submergence of individual differences and perspectives in the supposition of an over-riding need for collective self-defense. But, inter-group mediation requires significant internal differentiation.
3. Oppression and Sociality.
Niebuhr locates collective egoism as arising from our inability to understand the interests of others as well as we do our own, and inability to give due attention to the rights of others. These points carry considerable insight, and in view of them, it is worth asking which social conditions and moral-intellectual practices reinforce limits on understanding or respect and which do not. These question are in turn related to large-scale social conditions and to concepts of the self and of moral development. One approach to them is to ask more directly about social conditions of an expanding self, inclined to more fully consider the rights and interests of others.
A prevalent reaction to oppression is motivational contraction. We may remove from ourselves the motivations, whether ambitions, greed, jealousy, or will to domination which we see as responsible for our own oppression. The reaction is to seek inner purity, negatively defined. Surely this moral teaching is capable of transforming people, making them less aggressive or egoistic. In view of its long history and the important role it plays in many lives and communities, it contributes to a mode of sociality deserving of some considerable respect. But respect does not require uncritical acquiescence or forbid critical examination.
The relevant mode of sociality is perhaps summed up in a negative reading of the Golden Rule: Do unto others nothing you would not have them do unto you. In many cases, this may be the only form of response to oppression with a real affect upon the oppressor. Turning the other cheek sometimes melts the hardest heart. But, realistically, we have to recognize that this will often have no positive affect. The moral cynic, projecting inner convictions, may be blinded to any motive beyond self-aggrandizement or self-defense and interpret motivational contraction as mere strategy. In these situations, appeasement of oppression tends to encourage it. Passive resistance does have value, but especially when isolated, it may be taken as evidence of openness to manipulation. Those who uncritically contract their own ambitions and desires, in the face of oppression, may be manipulated by reference to remaining, more limited, ambitions and desires. Oppression prospers by manipulation of legions of the subdued.
Some of Niebuhr's descriptions of our failures to limit collective conflict suggest a similar analysis. He remarks that "the very extension of human sympathies has...resulted in the creation of larger units of conflict" (p. 49).So civilization has become a device for delegating the vices of individuals to larger and larger communities. The device gives men the illusion that they are moral; but the illusion is not lasting. A technological civilization has created an international community, so interdependent as to require, even if not powerful enough or astute enough to achieve, ultimate social harmony (p. 49).If civilization has indeed delegated the vices of individuals to larger and larger communities, questions arise concerning the mechanism involved, and one plausible explanation is that this "delegating of the vices of individuals" proceeds by a motivational contraction of subordinate individuals in the face of oppression or difficulties, self-imposed limits on autonomy, which tap energies for large-scale purposes and conflicts. This idea boarders on questions concerning "training of the will," (cf. Callaway 1993a), the proper relationship of socialization and autonomy, and how education can encourage independence.
Niebuhr's explanation is suggestive in several essential features. "The modern nation," he observed, "is divided into classes and the classes exhibit a greater disproportion of power and privilege than in the primitive community." He connects social inequalities with external aggression in a manner reminiscent of Marxist theories of imperialism, and had in mind, I suspect, social developments leading up to the first World War. "The social inequality leads not only to internal strife," he continued, "but to conflict between various national communities, by prompting the more privileged and powerful classes to seek advantages at the expense of other nations so that they may consolidate the privileges they have won at the expense of their own nationals" (p. 49).
Where might a "delegation of the vices of individuals" come into this? Passive acquiescence in the purposes of powers-that-be, with the hope or promise of benefit, is the initial step in the process—leading from internal oppression to external aggression. Niebuhr's model in the above discussion is chauvinistic nationalism, though similar patterns can be found in other collective conflicts. In so far as people acquiesce in internal oppression, which often operates by means of distorting interpretations, depending upon authoritarian flows of information among insiders, the vice of personal aggression (or egoism) may be transformed into a social sanction of collective aggression against outsiders. The personal and political motives of those exercising power are no longer put in question, and internally generated opinions operate without external check. Conflicts within a community are suppressed and transformed into a forced social unity, external aggression and /or exploitation of socially weaker groups and individuals.
The result is the creation of a negative image of out-group persons, activities, or communities (scapegoat and "devil" images) which constitute a manipulatable, partial identity of the in-group. (What "we" are is "not-that.") Fuller commitment to the newly fashioned group identity is then achieved by conflict with the out-group, which confirms the roles and positions of persons in various positions on both sides of the conflict. Too much of our effort against chauvinistic nationalism or racism, to consider the obvious examples, takes the form of combating this final symptom rather than facing the task of developing positive self-identities, founded in cooperative self-expression, which naturally resist the first steps.
4. Democratic individualism and moral community.
A reply to Niebuhr's challenge, in Dewey's work, can be brought to focus by emphasis on Dewey's conception of "democratic individualism" (Dewey 1939, p. 179) and a corresponding conception of moral community. "A society of free individuals in which all, through their own work, contribute to the liberation, and enrichment of the lives of others," said Dewey, "is the only environment in which any individual can really grow normally to his full stature" (Dewey 1940, p. 298). Responsibility for the character of our communities is here motivationally grounded in self-realization. Contributing to the liberation and enrichment of the lives of others requires us to think and act on our own initiative and to assist others in doing so, and this activity is crucial for self-development. In a significant sense, Dewey proposes an ethics of the social environment here. We are to actively concern ourselves with the improvement of our social environments instead of simply competing in exploitation of the world as we find it.
We must take account both our own interests and those of others, and doing so is greatly facilitated by cooperative engagement with others in relatively unproblematic tasks. In its final stages, this requires argumentation, since argumentation is a means of explaining and relating views significantly different from those of your audience. It is particularly needed in mediating differing basic value orientations, for here we use the same words to express very different ideas: values absorbed in childhood, in the family, or religious community, before the age at which we could evaluate them. Perhaps the most significant parameters of our basic value orientations are those which influence our willingness to reach out beyond our own communities of sympathy.
My argument is that genuine moral community is impossible without democratic individualism—an individualism oriented to the potentialities of fuller participation and cooperation of others. Moral community is also needed to constrain the excesses of individual strivings, including acquisitiveness, the power-mugger with the just-in-time prejudice, and destructive competition, but we must see that these excesses depend on the acquiescence of followers. Many are blind to this point, and inclined to blame great social evils upon those at the top, forgetting all those who go along. But intolerance or indifference to the day-to-day competition of ideas, and indifference to the plight of others, often amounts to support for over-competitiveness, and acquiescence in less desirable means of competition. Silence and indifference among followers, prominent symptoms of motivational contraction, are means of unscrupulous manipulation. In order that evil should triumph, it is only necessary that good people remain silent.
Genuine moral community must sustain independent perspectives and judgments upon its activities. Where this does not exist, community degenerates into a small-scale "block-universe." All essential questions are regarded as already answered, and all chief issues are settled by a (more or less self-interested) conventionalistic-conformist consensus. Strongly ideological conflicts prefigure a single social "block universe."
It is a condition of genuine moral community, then, that an individual in moral conflict be able to appeal to independent judgment for support. (This is the moral idea behind the judicial right to trial by a jury of peers.) But where relevant opinion is subject to manipulation and prejudicial pre-conceptions, especially as enforced by centralizing social-economic dependence, the appeal to independent judgment is pointless. Genuine moral judgment is no longer exercised where overall community opinion is dictated by conformity to reigning orthodoxies collectively enforced. This is what is wrong with movements for "political correctness." Outward conformity cannot substitute for a meeting of hands, hearts, and minds; and neither can a politics of the relationships of established social groups substitute for the development of local communities of inquiry and moral concern. To avoid collective egoism, we need in Dewey's phrase, a "creative democracy," of individual and community participation.
We do not expect a free and independent press where all economic activities, and hence all publication, falls under direct government ownership or control. Where the careers and prospects of editors are subject to governmental whim, the public press will be excessively timid. Suspicions also fall heavily upon newspapers whose supply of newsprint is subject to administrative whim. This is a less direct but equally effective means of censorship. Private ownership is a means of empowering independent voices. Control of the public press by vested interests remains possible, but the problems are more manageable. We come to think of government and business as being held up to public scrutiny by the press; and though the independent press may have its own vested interests, a division of powers facilitates diversity of opinion and expression.
My point concerning the value of independent thought to moral community is similar. Genuine moral community cannot exist where social-economic dependence enforces a uniformity of thought and feeling tailored to the perceived and often unspoken requirements of an established system. A monopoly of social power is self-destructive, just because it excludes significant participation of critics. Any social system or organization becomes impressed with the particular interests of those occupying its positions of power and influence. They resist developments which threaten those particular interests, so long as they have effective control over the positions, well-being, or incomes of anyone expressing contrary points of view. This was the fatal flaw in the dream of world socialism. The concentration of economic power it advocated escaped the various frying pans of pluralism for the fire of economic monism and absolutism.
The social problems of establishing conditions for independence of thought and judgment are endemic to human organization: conflicts of interest. The liberal answer to this problem, politically expressed, is a separation and balancing of powers. Individual freedoms, not subject to majority control, also represent a division of powers. However, separation of powers on the individual level is ineffective without moral empowerment of individual thought and conscience—respect for individuals and their diverse interests. Thus, individualism is crucial to liberal society, because it is crucial to the existence of genuine moral community. Moral support for individuals, combined with needed criticism of acquisitiveness and destructive competition, is central to any viable liberalism. Where it is missing, liberalism has lost its soul to ideology.
It is only in the context of this conclusion, that the deeper significance of racism and ethnic egoism can be deciphered—in American society and elsewhere. It is the pervasive evidence of moral blindness and lack of moral fiber in our communities. Genuine moral fiber, and independent judgment, enable those treated unjustly to appeal to their peers for vindication and redress of grievances. The existence of racism makes clear that entire sub-populations are disadvantaged and treated as scapegoats—made to suffer and carry the blame for the mistakes and errors of others. Racism, though, is a symptom of broader moral weakness, evidence of diverse self-serving prejudices distorting moral judgments to favor established powers, or self-insulated interests, and their supporting, privileged, entourages.
No solution to these problems will be found without moral empowerment of individuals and fair-minded discussion of their moral claims. We must take impartial account of the unique moral interests of others. Through broader respect for the distinctive moral interests and perspectives of each person, seeking opportunities for their integration, growth, development, and correction, we can reform our local communities so as to make them less susceptible to collective egoism and exaggerated conflicts. All of this is part of what Dewey meant by "creative democracy."
5. Romantic collectivism vs. collective intelligence.
Uncritical attachment to reference groups involves an essentially negative and/or passive self-identity on the part of subordinate members of the group. Crucial elements of autonomy are delegated to leaders or to the group conceived as a whole, as a condition of membership and protection. In particular, limits are accepted on the autonomy of goals and purposes. What is central though are limitations on the social mediation of goals and purposes. This kind of social formation functions to defend established interests against external and internal enemies, real or imagined. The prominence of the "devil-images," underscores the flights of imagination involved.
Collective intelligence essentially involves cooperation and coordination of differing skills, abilities, attitudes, and special areas of knowledge. It requires an open-mindedness to what others have to contribute but excludes simple acquiescence in the ultimate validity or value of what is claimed or contributed. This open-mindedness is a natural expression of fallibilism. To be open to the views and contributions of others is to allow that we might learn from them or benefit from their special contributions. Fallibilism expressed as a social attitude is a form of tolerance. But this fallibilistic tolerance is not the familiar easy acceptance without judgment. In particular, it is no justification of relativism. (Cf. Callaway 1994.)
To say that my beliefs are subject to error and that I may benefit from the contributions of others is not to suspend my beliefs or throw my own abilities into question. The fact that one may be wrong or deficient, just because it applies to everything, applies to nothing effectively. It generates of itself no genuine doubts, unless a Cartesian anxiety is already present. On the contrary, it is only by making use of my present beliefs and abilities that I can hope to come to any reasonable and effective assessment of differing beliefs and the contributions of others. I cannot find the genuine value others have to offer except by trying to estimate it from my own perspective (cf. Bernstein 1985, pp. 137-38; Gadamer 1979, pp. 151-52).
Understanding others is more than a passive listening or acceptance. It requires that conflicts and differences be explored. But the process of mutual exploration is often sacrificed to the golden calf of efficiency. We over-emphasize products, and superficially congenial relations, to the detriment of processes of creation and deeper understanding. Neglect of required social processes is part of this. We need to dwell on how defective social process, or the absence of significant social process, diminishes the quality of life.
Romantic collectivism is an antithesis of collective intelligence, dependent on that neglect of social-epistemic processes which is typical of extreme social duress. Thus, when we call for liberal solidarity, we must specify with whom and for what purpose. Otherwise there is temptation to emphasize "liberation" at the expense of liberty, and the continuity of the liberal tradition is lost from sight. It is traditional to see political and social rigidities as expressed by epistemic absolutism, because absolutism has so often represented exclusion of alternatives. But relativism is equally capable of inducing social rigidities. Excluding the possibility of mediation, we also exclude the possibility of seeing the value of what others have to offer and the human value of those who differ from us.
Fallibilism is the alternative to both absolutism and relativism. If we see how a fallibilistic attitude naturally accompanies efforts at mutual understanding, then we have also seen, in outline, how both absolutism and relativism may exacerbate defects in the social infrastructures needed for the growth of knowledge and mutual understanding. Just as absolutism expresses the over-idealized desire for certainty and universal understanding, and may cloak a will to domination, relativism in the form of a cynical disillusion with absolutistic certainties and universalistic aspirations may equally issue in collective egoisms, and conflicts among particular groups, cloaking itself in loyalty to particularities. Relativism is a degenerate tolerance, just as absolutism is an over-rigidity of the socially situated self. Both block the continuity of inquiry and the democratic growth of communities.
6. Conclusion: the individual in community.
Romantic collectivism transforms conflicts of values into large-scale human conflicts by the creation and maintenance of unrealistic expectations and uncritical attachments. The values sustaining these social formations foster conflicts less easily resolved. I see doctrines of the inevitability of collective egoism as part of the problem, though the practical problems are often extreme. We dare not forget the not-so-distant social-political context of Niebuhr's book, written in the depths of the depression with democracy under attack from right and left. Still, as Dewey observed even under the war clouds of 1939, the greatest threat to democracy comes from within, "the existence within our own personal attitudes and within our own institutions of conditions similar to those which have given a victory to external authority, discipline, uniformity, and dependence upon The Leader..." (Dewey 1939, p. 98).
We need to achieve a new dynamic balance between the requirements of community and the moral interests of individuals, and we need a deeper understanding of their relationships. Atomistic individualism immune to persuasion and lacking the normative guidance of community is morally blind, often issuing in acquisitiveness and the will to domination. But community rigidly configured as a "block universe" and lacking concern for the emerging interests of individuals is moral empty: inadequate to deal with development and all too capable of empowering domination. These are two sides of the same bad coin.
Our roots in democratically structured community and our autonomy within it jointly mediate the continuity of tradition and innovation; and the prospect of self-realization in our communities is the ultimate sanction of our loyalty to them. To anchor individuals within communities and to encourage each of us to take responsibility for the moral character of our social environment, we need methods of mediation allowing individuals active roles in community, whether in a neighborhood, at work, in a city, or in an ethnic or religious group. The smaller the community, the more significant the potential for participation. Overall, it is imperative in our nation of immigrants to avoid a single-mined power-politics of ethnic or religious communities, and this lesson of American experience has broad significance in a world grown ever smaller. Cooperativeness is capable of reaching beyond the existing sympathies of our communities in order to expand sympathy where such expansion may do the most good.
Regarding practical means of mediation, Dewey provided one of the best concise statement I know: through our own work, we must strive to "contribute to the liberation, and enrichment of the lives of others." By taking responsibility for the moral character of our communities, and the character of our human relations, we avoid acquiescence in existing evils, as the means of self-advancement; and we may still hope that in the human world we have helped to create, each may find an environment where we can grow normally to our full stature.
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Russett, Bruce (1993) Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
END OF: Callaway, "Values and Conflicts of Values in the Pragmatist Tradition"
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